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THE LAWYER AS CAREGIVER: CHILD
CLIENT'S COMPETENCE IN CONTEXT
Peter Margulies*
INTRODUCTION
am the father of a two-year-old girl. In my more lucid moments, I
want to letmy daughter, Sarah, explore the world. Still, I try to stay
no more than a quick dive across the room away from Sarah during
her explorations.
When Sarah is twelve-years-old, my feelings will probably not be
much different. In my lucid moments, I will probably want Sarah to
make her own decisions and her own mistakes. I am sure, however,
that I will not be able to entirely suppress the impulse to dive across
the room.
At first blush, the role of the lawyer for children seems radically
different from that of the parent.' Some commentators argue that the
* Associate Professor, St. Thomas University School of Law. B.A., 1978, Col-
gate University; J.D., 1981, Columbia University. I thank Naomi Cahn, Bob Diner-
stein, Marty Guggenheim, Ellen Saideman, and Steve Wzner for their comments on a
previous draft. I have benefitted from participation in the Fordham Law School Con-
ference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, presentations at
the St. Thomas Law School Faculty Forum, and the Law and Community Section of
the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools in San
Antonio, Texas, and conversations with Margrit Bernstein, Kate Federle, Bruce
Green, Maddie Kurtz, Daniella Levine, Bernie Perlmutter, and Ann Shalleck.
1. The literature on lawyering for children is extensive. See Donald N. Bersoff,
Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J.
Fain. L. 27 (1976-77); Katherine H. Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking
the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L.
Rev. 1655 (1996); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Pro-
tecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 565 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not Heard.-
Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Wal-
lace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of
a Standard, 16 J. Fain. L. 1 (1977-78); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best
Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 1505 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing
Ethically-Based Conflicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers
Who Serve the Same Client, 1-Mar. Ky. Children's Rts. J. 15 (1991); Shannan L. Wil-
ber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fain. L.Q. 349 (1993); Stephen Wizner &
Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer for a Child Too Young to be a Client: A Clinical
Study, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 330 (1989); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Note, Speaking for a Child
The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681 (1987); Kim J.
Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child Principles of Repre-
sentation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126
(1978) [hereinafter Lawyering for the Child]. For discussions of law reform litigation
for children, see Robert H. Mnookin et al., In The Interest of Children: Advocacy,
Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients:
The Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L.
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lawyer by definition is an agent. As an agent, a lawyer is responsible
to another person-the principal or the client. The client, as princi-
pal, controls the lawyer, as agent, by expressing preferences upon
which the agent'acts. Under this view, if the principal expresses no
preferences, the agent has no basis for action. Similarly, if the agent
believes that the principal is incompetent to make a decision, the
agent's proper course is withdrawal.
In cases involving children, such as custody, abuse and neglect, and
delinquency proceedings, lawyers confront the issue of competence
regularly.3 As a result, lawyers representing children in such proceed-
ings must confront questions about the legitimacy of the lawyer's role.
This Article addresses how lawyers representing children should de-
fine competence, and what the lawyer's role should be when a child
client appears to be incompetent.
Competence, defined broadly as a person's ability and right to make
decisions, is always a difficult issue. Specific conditions-mental re-
tardation, Alzheimer's disease, or psychoses stemming from schizo-
phrenia or manic depressive illness-fuel concerns about the
competence of people with mental disabilities and senior citizens.4
Rev. 1435 (1996); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy
in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 919 (1986) (reviewing Mnookin et al., supra).
2. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 86-87.
3. See Peggy C. Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk:
Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 139 (1995). The litera-
ture on substantive law regarding children is even larger than the commentary on
lawyering. See Stephen Wizner, Do the Poor Have a Right to Family Integrity?, in
Child, Parent, and State 299 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Janet E. Ainsworth,
Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolish-
ing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083 (1991); David L. Chambers, Rethinking
the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1984);
Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody
Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 (1994) [hereinafter Resolv-
ing Custody Disputes]; Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for
Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983
(1993) [hereinafter Reconceiving Rights]; Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference,
and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11 (1994); Martha
Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9
Harv. Women's L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen Wizner, Commentary on Children's Rights, 17
Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Barbara B.
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992); cf. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A
Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 75 (1993) (analyzing gender ste-
reotypes in images of "bad mothers" accused of child abuse).
4. Lawyers should presume, however, that both senior citizens and people with
mental disabilities are competent. For commentary on competence and attorney-cli-
ent relationship, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Has-
tings LJ. 769 (1992); Stanley S. Herr, Representations of Clients with Disabilities:
Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609 (1990); David
Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454; Peter Margulies,
Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citi-
zens of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1073, 1073-76 (1994) [hereinafter
1474 [Vol. 64
LAWYER AS CAREGIVER
With regard to children, however, the issue of competence raises spe-
cial problems. The law deems minors to be incompetent in many con-
texts.5 In legal proceedings such as custody and child welfare the law
tends to view children below a certain age, say, twelve, as incapable of
making decisions about their lives. 6
These legal images of incapacity are so powerful because society
cannot separate its view of a child's competence from the perception
that the child will eventually grow into an adult. The law stresses pro-
tecting the options of the adult that the child will be in five, ten, or
fifteen years. While society entrusts the adult to look after her own
future, it views the child as prone to particular kinds of mistakes, most
prominently a preference for short-term over long-term thinking,
7
which justify the assumption of a caregiving role by adults.
The contextual view of lawyering for children advanced in this Arti-
cle holds that lawyers for children must be caregivers as well as agents.
Central to this contextual perspective is the recognition that a parent
and a lawyer for children face a similar dilemma. They both must
respect the child's voice-her sharing of experience and insight, in-
Access, Connection, and Voice]; Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and
Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61 (1988); Paul R. Trem-
blay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably
Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515.
This Article's argument is consistent with the view that child clients who express a
preference are also presumptively competent. That presumption should inform, but
not preclude, client-lawyer conversation about the reasons underlying client prefer-
ences, and the consequences of client decisions.
5. In areas such as abortion, courts have approved special procedures for minors
that individually assess decision-making capacity. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
642-44 (1979). Contract law presumes minors incompetent to make contracts. See
John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 8-1 (3d ed. 1987).
6. The law requires, for example, that a next friend or guardian ad litem repre-
sent the interests of a minor child in custody and child welfare proceedings. See
Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
7. See Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Chil-
dren's Rights, 16 Nova L. Rev. 711,716 (1992). For a thoughtful analysis of adolescent
decision making, see Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making
in Legal Contexts, 19 L. & Hum. Behav. 221 (1995).
8. A number of commentators recently have sought to lend context to the rela-
tionship between lawyering and client voice. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyer-
ing 49-57 (1992); Naomi R. Calm, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. LJ. 2475, 2499-2505
(1993); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992);
Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2491-94 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking the Truth to
Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 850-55 (1995);
Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 Geo. L.J. 2665, 2679-
82 (1993); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L.
Rev. 1139, 1160 (1995) (reviewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and The Law (1993) and
Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession
(1993)) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering]; Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor
Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference
and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 695, 699 (1994) [hereinafter The
Mother With Poor Judgment]; Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4,
14751996]
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cluding the pain of not being taken seriously by adults.' Indeed, par-
ents and lawyers must recognize that a child's finding her voice is an
essential element of her well-being. Making mistakes is a central ele-
ment in a child's finding her voice. However, in interpreting a child's
voice, parents and lawyers must also consider a child's need for educa-
tion and connection with others. In some contexts meeting these
needs requires the child's lawyer to intervene, and thus prevent her
client from making mistakes.
Lawyers use competence and capacity to indicate when intervention
is appropriate. The concept of competence endures stress because of
the heavy lifting lawyers require of it. Because no two situations are
identical, a clear test for determining the competence of a child to
make decisions does not exist. Nevertheless, the determination is
often critical to the child's future. Yet, unlike other articles that urge
the law to go beyond the "competency construct,"'1 this Article ar-
gues that competence embodies a concern for voices and persons that
we should not abandon. To do justice to the concept of a child's com-
at 1076-80; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative
In Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 563-70 (1994); Martha Minow, Breaking the
Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 739-
49 (1991); Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1435-45 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers,
104 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 515-19 (1990).
The contextual literature shares a critical perspective on traditional lawyer practices
with the new poverty lawyering literature, which views traditional lawyering as dis-
empowering clients and communities. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Vio-
lence, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1320-39 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of
Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721, 1747-50 (1994)
(reviewing Law's Violence (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Anthony
V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative,
100 Yale L.. 2107,2118-30 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Practice]; Ruth
Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical
Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 690-92
(1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 45-46 (1990); see also Margaret E.
Montoya, Mascaras,-Trenzas,-Y-Grenas: Un/masking the Self While Un/Braiding
Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 2-37 (1994) (discuss-
ing the tension between the dominant legal system and identity as a member of a
subordinated group); cf. Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Educa-
tion and Scholarship, 43 Hastings LJ. 1187 (1992) (arguing that progressive academics
are not well-suited to study lawyering because they lack the practical experience of
working with clients, lawyers, and judges); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the
Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-88 (1992) (discussing the problems
encountered by practioners in applying the principles set forth in academic literature).
For an important early critical perspective on lawyering, see William H. Simon, Vi-
sions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
9. See Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at 97-98.
10. See Federle, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 3, at 985; Federle, Resolving Cus-
tody Disputes, supra note 3, at 1527-34; Jan E. Rein, Clients with Destructive and So-
cially Harmful Choices-What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the
Competency Construct, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1101, 1107 (1994).
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petency in legal proceedings, however, the law must recognize the di-
verse contexts in which competency arises.
Contextually addressing competency has several implications. First,
lawyers must acknowledge that competency is contingent. Lawyers do
not discover competency; they make it." A lawyer representing chil-
dren can enhance or injure competency. The lawyer's openness to in-
put from various sources-the child, the child's family and peers, and
social service professionals' 2-as well as the lawyer's sensitivity to is-
sues of class, race, disability, and gender contribute to creating
competence.' 3
Because competence is contingent, it varies with the decision the
client confronts. The consequences of the decision, and judgments
about norms shared in the lawyer's "interpretive community," 4 each
affect the lawyer's estimation of the child's competence. For these
reasons, examining competence in context entails a substantive assess-
ment of the client's decision.
Integrating substance and process informs the lawyer's role if she
determines that the child is incompetent. The contextual approach
gives the lawyer discretion about how to proceed. She can take a sub-
stantive position, mediate between the parties, act as a fact finder for
the court, or adopt a combination of these approaches. Proponents
of the lawyer-as-agent perspective, which this Article calls the restric-
tive view, express profound concern about such flexibility in lawyer's
roles. Taking a substantive position on behalf of a concededly incom-
petent client raises serious doubts about the legitimacy of the lawyer's
function. One lawyers' group recently cited such doubts as a justifica-
11. This conception of competency resembles nuanced conceptions of the client's
goals in an attorney-client relationship. Also, client goals do not come ready-made,
but instead are a product of dialogue and interaction between attorney and client. See
Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 128-
34 (1993).
12. Of course, the lawyer also has an obligation to assess critically each of these
perspectives, particularly the social service professional's assertion of expertise. See
Chambers, supra note 3, at 484; Martha Fneman, Dominant Discourse, Professional
Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
727, 760-68 (1988).
13. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. For an analysis of race in con-
structing competence in special education, see Theresa Glennon, Race, Education,
and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
14. See generally Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class? (1980) (discussing
the importance of "interpretive community"). Of course, shared norms in any inter-
pretive community may subordinate persons or groups within that community. Cf.
Drucilla Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 679 (1986) (critiquing
Fish); David Luban, Fish v. Fish or, Some Realism About Idealism, 7 Cardozo L. Rev.
693 (1986) (same); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 639 (1990) (same). Because of this risk of subordination, those assessing compe-
tency should follow substantive presumptions, and receive training, designed to re-
duce invidious biases in competency assessments.
14771996]
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tion for barring the lawyer from taking a substantive position.15 The
restrictive view would limit the lawyer to a fact-finding role on behalf
of a child client whom the lawyer determines to be incompetent.
The contextual approach responds to this concern not by limiting
the lawyer's role, but by offering substantive guidance based on values
expressed in case law and statutes. Three substantive factors should
aid the lawyer: (1) continuity of caregiving, assessed with reference to
the status quo before the commencement of legal proceedings; (2)
parents' commitment of time to their child's education; and (3)
preventing violence against the child or other family members.
Addressing competence in context is a challenging task. To assist in
this inquiry, part I of this Article examines the competency problem in
greater depth. It identifies three central values: education, connec-
tion, and voice. Part II considers established theories of decisional
competence and the attorney-child client relationship and identifies
problems with these theories. Part III outlines a contextual approach
to assessing competency which minimizes these problems, and details
six factors important to assessing capacity in a contextual approach.
Part IV describes the lawyer's role in enhancing capacity through in-
volving child clients in the lawyer's consultation with social service
professionals, seeking input from peers and family, and receiving
training on the risk of bias in custody decision making. Finally, part V
examines critically the restrictive view's endorsement of a fact finder
only approach to lawyering for incompetent children, and suggests a
contextual model for lawyers facing this challenge.
I. THE PROBLEM: CAPACITY AND ITS DiscoNTTs
Capacity is a difficult issue because the law hopes that by defining
capacity correctly it can solve a bewildering array of problems. Yet, in
dealing with capacity problems as they affect children, the law tends to
rely on presumptions opposite to the presumptions it utilizes in deal-
ing with problems as they affect adults. Consider how the law weighs
tensions between autonomy and welfare. With respect to adults, the
black letter law is that autonomy is paramount. For instance, an adult
may refuse a life-saving operation, citing autonomy concerns, even
though on most measures the operation is necessary for that person's
welfare. 6 The law, however, applies the opposite approach to chil-
dren, particularly young children. Welfare is paramount, and an oper-
15. See Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation
Proceedings §§ 2.7, 2.12 (Am. Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1995) [hereinafter
Academy Standards]. The Reporter for the Academy Standards, Prof. Martin Gug-
genheim, has been the most trenchant critic of the movement toward appointment of
counsel for children in custody and child welfare cases. See Guggenheim, supra note
1, at 125.
16. Thor v. Superior Ct., 855 P.2d 375, 381-83 (Cal. 1993).
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ation will be forced on an unwilling subject regardless of her
expressed wishes.' 7
The law's attitude toward children as clients follows this pattern,
even though in many cases the law empowers children as rights bear-
ers by offering them attorneys. Paradoxically, the law is wary of ex-
tending to children the autonomy it typically associates with rights
bearers.' When a court appoints an attorney for a child in a custody
dispute or abuse and neglect proceeding, for example, the court does
not ask the child if she wants an attorney. Similarly, a child's authority
to discharge a court-appointed attorney is unclear.' 9
This wariness about autonomy extends to particular issues con-
fronted by lawyers for children. Suppose, for example, that a twelve-
year-old child in a custody dispute informs his appointed lawyer that
he wants his father to have custody because his father will not make
him do homework. Apart from certain situations involving senior citi-
zens2 ° and people with mental disabilities-two groups that to some
extent are marginalized in our society-a lawyer's training would mili-
tate against intervening for an adult client's own good regarding
homework or any other issue. Yet, it seems justifiable to intervene in
the case of a child client, even though many attorneys would still be
reluctant to engage in such intervention.
How can society explain or justify this disparate treatment of adults
and children? One factor is that separating autonomy and welfare en-
genders a false dichotomy. The two concerns are interrelated. For
example, a child subject to domestic violence, or living in a home in
which others are so subject, loses autonomy even if she tells a lawyer
she "wants" to stay in that home. Exposure to domestic violence nar-
rows life chances: it heightens the risk of homelessness as an adult,
and of either victimization by others or victimization of others.2 '
Three values inform a contextual approach to the competency of
children as clients: education, connection, and voice. By considering
these crucial values, autonomy and welfare may be integrated and to-
gether used to determine a child's competence.
17. Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk. On State Supervention of
Parental Autonomy, in Child, Parent, and State 460, 464 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds.,
1994).
18. See Federle, Resolving Custody Disputes, supra note 3, at 1527-34.
19. See id. at 1523-24.
20. See Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1076-80 (dis-
cussing capacity of senior citizens).
21. See Mary P. Koss et al., Understanding The Perpetrator and the Victim: Who
Abuses and Who is Abused, in No Safe Haven: Male Violence Against Women at
Home, at Work, and in The Community 19, 23-27, 34-38 (American Psychological
Ass'n 1994); Beth Weitzman et al., Predictors of Shelter Use Among Low-Income
Families: Psychiatric History, Substance Abuse, and Victimization, 82 Am. J. Pub.
Health 1547, 1547 (1992).
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A. Education
A lawyer for children must consider that children are still in the
formative years of an education in life and values. Education here
refers to both cognition and judgment. Childhood connotes the devel-
opment of cognition-the ability to process information. Equally im-
portant, childhood involves the accumulation of experience.
Experience informs cognition and shapes judgement by enriching
stark choices with lived and felt memory.22 While cognition, accord-
ing to some studies, develops by the early teens,' experience and
judgement lag behind.24 A lawyer coping with her client's still-devel-
oping experience and judgment must know when to intervene and
when to step back.
The case for intervention stems from the concern that children,
lacking experience and judgment, may not adequately assess the con-
sequences of decisions. For example, children, compared with adults,
weigh short-term consequences more heavily than long-term ramifica-
tions. A useful analogy here is Saul Steinberg's famous cartoon map
depicting a New Yorker's view of the world. In the cartoon, New
York City is the dominant piece of geography. The Hudson River is
the dominant body of water. The rest of the United States, the Pacific
Ocean, and the rest of the world recede into obscurity. For children,
short-term consequences are like New York City in the Steinberg car-
toon, dwarfing everything else.
Children's inexperience with long-term concerns affects their
choices. The tendency to discount long-term effects may make chil-
dren more likely than adults to engage in high-risk behavior, where
short-term gains, like "thrills and chills," or short-term losses, like os-
tracism from one's peer group for declining to take a risk, are salient.
The tendency to discount long-term effects also may make children
more likely to reject courses of action with beneficial long-term conse-
quences but adverse short-term impacts. For example, teenagers may
be more willing to drink and drive, while less willing to accept medical
treatment, such as a leg brace, that may be embarrassing in peer group
interactions.'
22. Feminist accounts of epistemology stress experience. See Phyllis Goldfarb, A
Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L.
Rev. 1599, 1642 (1991). So do prudentialist accounts of judgement which view experi-
ence as promoting moderation and tempering radicalism. See Kronman, supra note
11, at 222-25. But see Margulies, Progressive Lawyering, supra note 8, at 1146 (arguing
that Kronman's account does not hold true for marginalized groups with no stake in
the status quo).
23. See Scott et al., supra note 7, at 224-26. These studies, however, took place.
under laboratory conditions which do not capture the nuances of real-world decision-
making. Il at 226.
24. hd at 227-28.
25. Ld. at 233-34.
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Society's concern with gaps in children's risk perceptions also
strikes a normative note. Society views children as a crucible of hope
for the future. Laws regarding children consider the child as a future
adult. The law assumes that once children have acquired the experi-
ence which comes with legal majority, their decisions about risk will
better balance short-term and long-term concerns. Similarly, an adult
will be better able to distinguish between values which help guide
one's life, and the whims, caprices, and addictions which obscure those
values. Preserving the child's opportunity for such growth is a pri-
mary social good.
At this point, the lawyer encounters a paradox: while society, by
intervening in a child's decisions, can preserve a child's opportunity to
grow, children also grow by making mistakes. The freedom to make
mistakes is a crucial element in acquiring experience. Much concrete
knowledge about consequences, for example, only accrues though ex-
periencing those consequences directly.2 6 Children have little incen-
tive to learn anything for themselves unless adults allow them to take
some risks.27
Harmonizing these two goals-considering the child's skewed per-
ceptions of risk while allowing the child to make her own mistakes-is
a central component of the contextual approach to lawyering for chil-
dren. A lawyer who appreciates the educational value of mistakes
may frequently view a child client's decision as mistaken, but nonethe-
less feel bound by that decision. Some mistakes, however, are irre-
versible, making future education impossible. A lawyer representing
children should try to prevent these mistakes, distinguishing them
from the mistakes that further education.28 Thus, lawyers.for children
26. This is also the premise of clinical legal educators, who argue that experience
in representing clients and working in communities offers knowledge which is unavail-
able though the perusing of appellate opinions in traditional law school casebooks.
See Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care Into Profes-
sional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1181-82 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 22,
at 1642-54 (1991); Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Educa-
tion, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 194 (1989); Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment,
supra note 8, at 704-05; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Educa-
tion, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731, 1739-42 (1993); see generally Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-
Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 Ind. L.
Rev. 115 (1993) (discussing the relationship between clinical professors and their stu-
dents); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About
Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980) (discussing Yale Law
School's clinical program).
27. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile 111 (Everyman ed. 1911).
28. Of course, we must also always be mindful that our view of what constitutes a
"mistake" necessarily is a function of our own assumptions and biases. When deci-
sions some think unwise stem from cultural differences, such as a decision to pursue a
course of home schooling rich in religion, rather than a secular public education, the
First Amendment often requires respect for that decision. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
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should have a role in balancing their client's perceptions of short-term
and long-term consequences.
B. Connection
Children's connection with others, particularly their parents, pro-
vides another reason to treat children differently from adults. While a
web of relationships defines each person,29 children's dependence
makes these connections even more salient. ° It makes no sense to
consider a parent's welfare without reference to the welfare of her
child. A mother, asked how she is doing, will not answer, "Fine," if
her child is sick. Similarly, a child's welfare is linked to the welfare of
her parents. In addition, continuity is vital for children's develop-
ment.31 Severing connections, such as the parent-child connection,
can destroy that continuity. A grave risk of child advocacy is that an
advocate will define the scope of representation in a way which ne-
glects the child's connections to her parents.3 2
C. Voice
Voice, the sharing of experience and insights, is the third element in
competence issues regarding children. Voice implies participation,
and a sense that others value one's opinions and sentiments. 3 This
sense is vital for children, particularly in conjunction with decisions
about custody and child welfare, which threaten children's sense of
control.
Voice is important for both instrumental and expressive reasons.
The participation of children can inform decision making, by bringing
to light information that professionals miss. 34 As suggested above,
however, competence also has an expressive dimension. Competence
is about reciprocity-if society subjects people to certain burdens,
people are entitled to input on how society allocates those burdens.
Reciprocity, at least as much as ability, explains why we offer adults of
29. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 3-84 (1958). To the extent that all
clients are part of a web of relationships, lawyers should always take connection into
account.
30. Scott et. al., supra note 7, at 229-30.
31. See Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at 81.
32. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 116-17. It is tempting to define one's role in
such a way, because the risks are much less palpable, particularly in the child welfare
context. No children's advocate wants to be on the front page of the newspaper if a
child returned to her parents subsequently dies from abuse. Cases of children re-
moved from parents, by contrast, are routine-they do not make the front page even
though they cause the break-up of families. The natural bias for children's advocates
is to act in a way which minimizes the first, more visible risk, even if it also maximizes
family break-ups. See Davis & Barua, supra note 3, at 142-43.
33. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1163-72.
34. See Lucy S. McGough, Child Witnesses 25-26 (1995) (citing an experiment
which demonstrates that children and adults focus on different elements of an event,
which although different are both highly relevant).
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widely disparate decision-making skills the right to vote, to marry, and
to contract. If the legal system takes steps that-affect children, such as
allocating custody to one parent or terminating parental rights, it
should take the time to listen to what children think.
II. LEGAL APPROACHES TO CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE
Two legal approaches to competency dominate lawyering for chil-
dren: the libertarian approach and the "mature minor" approach.
Unfortunately, neither approach pays sufficient attention to the con-
text in which lawyers assess a child's competence. In searching for a
clear test, the approaches ignore important considerations that bear
on the issue of a child's competency.
A. The Libertarian Approach: Competence at Virtually Any Age
One approach to dealing with competency is to either do away with
competence as a predicate for decision making and rely solely on the
importance of voice, or to deem virtually any child, or any person,
who can express wishes as competent.35 This approach, the libertarian
approach, takes as its premise two propositions: (1) the ability to
make decisions without being second-guessed is an essential attribute
of human dignity and autonomy; and (2) competence is often a fig leaf
used to hide grasping for power by professionals entrusted to deter-
mine competence. While both propositions have. merit, ultimately
neither compels the conclusion libertarians advocate.
The authority to make decisions for oneself is a central aspect of
human dignity and autonomy. The crucial questions, however, re-
main: what do lawyers for children mean by dignity, autofiomy, and
self? The value of connection suggests that self, for example, cannot
be understood without reference to others. Making a decision for
one's self necessarily involves this plural understanding of self. Free-
dom also entails connections: Freedom from family connections is not
freedom, in a positive sense, but a radical detachment which makes a
person less, not more, human.
Similarly, while the libertarian emphasis on professional power is a
legitimate concern, it assumes a world in which the self is radically
unconnected and not subject to power already. Individuals are subject
to a myriad of connections, and always subject to power, from other
people, from institutions, and from their own whims, wishes, and ad-
dictions.36 Professionals, rather than introducing power where none
previously was exercised, may in fact countervail power which already
35. See Federle, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 3, at 1011-15.
36. See Steven L. Wmter, The "Power" Thing (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author) (offering a post-modem, "four-dimensional" view of power informed
by the thought of Michel Foucault).
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affects a person adversely. The real question is, how is this power
being used, and how does it affect the persons involved?
B. The "Mature Minor" Approach: The Presumptive Competence
of Adolescents
Another approach to the issue of the competence of children is to
presume that children above a certain age, twelve for example, are
competent. While this "mature minor" approach is valuable as a
rough guide to determining competency, it nevertheless begs the ques-
tion confronted in this Article: How should lawyers consider factors
that rebut a presumption of capacity?
Although the mature minor approach enjoys support,37 it ignores
distinct issues, such as custody, delinquency, or medical treatment,
that may involve different kinds of competence. Different children on
either side of age-based presumptions will perform differently on each
of these issues. On some occasions, the age-based presumption will
discouit unduly the capacities of younger children who may be able to
communicate a meaningful preference or offer useful information.38
On other occasions, an age-based presumption will overstate the deci-
sion-making capacity of adolescents, who may posture because of at-
tempts to break free of parental regulation. When courts are not
involved, families will often be able to absorb such rites of passage.
The involvement of the judicial system, however, raises the stakes for
everyone and can elicit posturing from many parties that would other-
wise not surface. This is clearly true in adults, for example, when fa-
thers seek custody as a bargaining chip in divorce. It can be true of
children, too. The difference is that with adults, posturing may be the
37. See Martin Guggenhein, supra note 1, at 82-85; see, e.g., Academy Standards,
supra note 15, § 2.2 (advocating for a rebuttable presumption that children above the
age of twelve are competent).
38. The most vigorous support for the mature minor standard in the context of
lawyering for children comes from commentators who view such lawyering as a threat
to parents' rights. See, e.g., Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights And Legal Represen-
tation-The Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Eth-
ics & Pub. Pol'y 423 (1993) (arguing that a parent's right to control litigation involving
young children should be protected). Representation of very young children in-
creases this threat because lawyers in this situation may discount the connections
young children have developed with parents and instead impose their own values. See
Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 154. This Article argues, however, that a lawyer who
takes seriously the possibility of learning something from a very young child client will
present less risk of disrupting connections. While it is tempting to not even talk to
younger children, see Wizner & Berkman, supra note 1, at 333, particularly the very
young, this seems to run counter to studies which suggest that even infants are taking
in information, and giving it out, at a spectacular rate. An advocate who accepts an
assignment in a custody case should be grateful for any information she can find. The
fact that the child may have seen many other adults in connection with a judicial
proceeding, such as social workers and psychologists, does not oust the lawyer from
her role. If other professionals have been sensitive, another intervention will not be
unduly intrusive. If the other professionals have been insensitive, the lawyer will have
an opportunity to prove that some people in the judicial system are different.
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product of a desire to exploit children for strategic purposes. With
children, posturing may be the product of being exploited. Compe-
tence is a rubric broad enough to encompass the latter problem.
Another problem with the mature minor approach is that it empha-
sizes intellectual development, while downplaying the role of experi-
ence and judgment. The premise of the mature minor approach is that
children acquire experience and judgment through making mistakes.
While this is often true, such a premise fails to distinguish between
mistakes which promote learning and mistakes, including irreversible
mistakes, which prejudice the ability to learn in the future. Making
such distinctions is one goal of a contextual approach.
Ill. APPLYING A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO COMPETENCY
A contextual approach to competency recognizes that competency
is contingent and constructed, varying with the decision involved, and
necessarily is constituted by considerations of both process and sub-
stance. Engaging the substance of decision making is a departure
from modem trends. Older analyses of competence looked either to
status-was someone old, young, a person of color, a woman, or a
person with a mental disability-or to the outcome of decisions.39
Under an outcome test, if the decision was substantively sound, from
the vantage point of the judge, doctor, or other arbiter, then the sub-
ject was competent.4°
Modem trends have frowned on the invidious biases of the status
test and the paternalistic and tautological character of the outcome
test. Often, modem approaches have focused on the "process" of de-
cision making.41 Yet, this focus raises as many questions as it answers.
The problem with the focus on process is that when an approach
denies the importance of substance, substance usually comes in
through the back door. Consideration of process is meaningless un-
less the approach first brings to bear some basic assumptions about
substance.42 In fact, any process-oriented view necessarily relies on
some underlying conception of substance. Consider, for example, the
issue of whether a client's decision fits a particular goal. In order to
39. See Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory,
and Law, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 763, 777-80 (1993).
40. See id. at 774-75.
41. See Scott, supra note 7, at 224.
42. Cf. Allen E. Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, Deciding For Others: The Ethics of
Surrogate Decision Making 51-57 (1989) (opting for more contextualized view of ca-
pacity); Gary Minda, Postmodem Legal Movements 108-27 (1995) (discussing critical
scholars' unpacking of the dichotomy between substance and process); Michael R.
Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1121, 1127-34 (1991) (casting doubt
on whether the concept of autonomy has a stable meaning); William H. Simon, Law-
yer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 Md. L. Rev. 213, 213 (1991)
(same).
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analyze this issue, a lawyer needs some independent conception of
what decisions serve what goals.
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Standards for the
.representation of children demonstrate the importance of integrating
substance and process in defining competence.43 The Academy Stan-
dards note, "For purposes of determining impairment, counsel's in-
quiry should focus on the process by which a client reaches a position,
not on the position itself."" In setting out how to assess this process,
however, the Academy Standards necessarily allude to substance.
They note, for example, that "counsel should look to the client's 'basic
understanding of the facts and possibilities described.' "I4 Of course,
to assess someone else's understanding of facts, a lawyer must com-
pare them with her own views, or with her perception of how "simi-
larly situated persons"4 6 might interpret a given situation. Indeed, the
Academy Standards expressly ask the lawyer to compare the child's
choice with the outcome that "similarly situated persons might
choose."'47
While the Academy Standards go on to say that a lawyer cannot
view her client as lacking capacity just because the client has made a
choice which the lawyer deems to be "not in the client's best inter-
ests,''ha this proviso seems to mean in practice that in close cases,
where the client's choice passes some baseline test of substantive plau-
sibility, the lawyer cannot second-guess the client. This lowers the risk
that children's lawyers will exercise untrammeled power, but it does
so in a way that is not illuminated by making the distinction between
substance and process.
To reinforce this point, consider two hypotheticals. In the first case,
a seven-year-old child tells her lawyer that she wishes to go live with
her father, who has abused both her and her mother, because she will
be embarrassed if classmates discover why she has moved. In the sec-
ond hypothetical, the child tells her lawyer that she wishes to live with
her mother, not her father. A social worker has told the lawyer that
the father has repeatedly abused both mother and child. The child
does not, however, cite the abuse in explaining her preference. In-
stead, the child asserts that her mother is Wonder Woman.
43. See Academy Standards, supra note 15, §§ 2.1-2.2.
44. Id. § 2.2 cmt. (emphasis added).
45. Id. (quoting Lois A. Weithorn, Involving Children in Decisions Affecting Their
Own Welfare, in Children's Competence to Consent 245, 248 (Gary B. Melton et al.
eds., 1983).
46. IL
47. Id The Academy Standards also recommend that the lawyer assess the child's
ability "to appreciate the consequences of each alternative course of action." Id
Here, too, one can only assess that ability if one has a substantive interpretation of
what those consequences might be.
48. Id.
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Analyzing the reasoning processes of the children in these hy-
potheticals is not helpful for the lawyer wondering about how to rep-
resent her client. The reasoning process of the child in the first
hypothetical, who can describe plausible consequences of an alterna-
tive course of action, is more sophisticated than the reasoning process
of the child in the second hypothetical, who enlists a comic book char-
acter to bolster her position.4 9 However, a lawyer will most likely
hesitate before acceding to the first child's wishes, but advocate in a
manner consistent with the wishes of the second child. Process does
not explain the decisions; only resort to the value of avoiding family
violence accounts for the lawyer's choices.
This observation triggers analysis of individual factors that reflect a
dialogue between substance and process. The following factors are
not a checklist. Using them as such will only replicate the mechanical
results of the narrow "lawyer as agent" view. Rather, these factors
should inform the lawyer's conversations with the person she
represents.
A. Ability to Articulate Reasoning
A child who is competent should be able to explain the reasoning
behind a decision. A child who tells a lawyer, "I don't feel like it,"
when the lawyer asks her why she doesn't want an operation, is not
articulating reasons. Nor is a client who tells a lawyer, "I don't like
the nurse," in response to the same question. In such cases, spite or
irrational fear may be the decision's catalyst.
The burden of justification for a decision rises with the gravity of
the decision. In some instances, the risk of harm created by a given
decision may be substantial and alternative decisions may not have a
comparable downside. If, the client's reasons for the decision are triv-
ial, such as, "I don't like the nurse," doubts about competence arise.
Allowing substantial risks to children based on whimsical or capri-
cious reasoning betrays the adult whom the child will become. The
law vindicates that prospective adult's interests when it demands a
more substantive justification.
To demonstrate this point, consider the operation hypothetical dis-
cussed above. If the child's initial wishes are overridden and the oper-
ation is performed, the child will probably be very satisfied with the
result. This is, of course, assuming that the risks and long-term pain
are negligible, and that the risks and pain of the condition requiring
surgery, such as a stomach obstruction, are substantial. In other cases,
however, a medical course of treatment may involve chronic pain or
discomfort, such as in the case of chemotherapy. Here, a child who
49. See Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1085-87 (dis-
cussing analogous situation involving senior citizens).
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responds, "I don't want this pain if I may die anyway," is offering a
reason completely in line with the risks involved.
Similarly, a child in a delinquency preceding who says, "I want to
fight this delinquency charge because I don't like the prosecutor," is
not giving a reason with any nexus to the risks of being adjudicated
delinquent, including spending time in a detention facility.50 A child
who turns down a deal to go to a counseling program because he says
he wants to "make the prosecutor prove his case," however, is offering
a reason rooted in dignity and citizenship. Indeed, this reason is the
same one that, experienced defense attorneys often give for going to
trial." It would be odd to hold that a reason relied on by defense
attorneys connotes incompetence in the mouth of a child.
B. Variability of State of Mind
Variability of state of mind is another characteristic of incompe-
tence that society associates with younger children. A client who
switches her decision constantly, each time taking the new position
with the alacrity formerly displayed for the opposite position, raises
doubts about competence. A child who says, "I definitely want to live
with my father," today, after having expressed a strong preference
yesterday for living with her mother, and a vigorous preference for
her father the day before that, is not manifesting sound decision mak-
ing. This must be distinguished, however, from ambivalence, in which
a client acknowledges that the issue is a close one, and because of this
tension changes her mind frequently. This latter condition, which may
sometimes trigger volatile behavior, may frequently occur in the
charged atmosphere of a custody proceeding, when children seek to
avoid alienating either parent. Such ambivalence requires that the at-
torney adopt a strategy52 to address her client's needs, for example, by
mediating between the parents.5
50. For a sensitive discussion about representation of criminal defendants with
backgrounds in the juvenile justice system, see Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility,
Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal De-
fense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 433 (1995).
51. Criminal defense lawyers invoking this rationale may, however, develop con-
flicts of interest with their clients. Conflicts can occur, for example, when a criminal
defendant wishes to cooperate with a government investigation, but his lawyer refuses
to facilitate such cooperation because of an antiprosecution perspective, concerns
about professional reputation, or pressures from third parties paying the lawyer's fees.
See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 111-26 (1995)
(identifying various situations where conflicts arise between defense attorneys and
their clients).
52. The attorney cannot be a bystander with questionably competent clients; she
must be a participant, seeking to bolster competence through conversation and expo-
sure of the client to peer groups and professional resources. See infra notes 72-78 and
accompanying text (discussing the value of peer groups).
53. See Wizner & Berkman, supra note 1, at 331.
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C. Ability to Understand Consequences
People cannot make competent decisions without some conception
of the consequences flowing from that decision. For a contextual view
of a decision, some concern about the decision's effects is crucial. In-
deed, on a pragmatic level, what happens as a result of a decision is
virtually the only important concern.54 Consequences are often un-
predictable. In certain cases, however, a lawyer will feel sufficiently
confident about her ability to predict the future that she may properly
conclude that a client's refusal to acknowledge particular conse-
quences demonstrates incapacity. In the case of a patient who de-
clines to acknowledge that gangrene, if not treated, will lead to death,
a lawyer has good reason to doubt the patient's competence.
How a person interprets consequences can vary, of course. One
person might look to fiscal or financial effects of a given decision,
while another might look to its effect on ethics, values, or identity-
less readily quantifiable, but still vital concerns. Any concept of cog-
nitive development should view attention by a decision maker to both
kinds of consequences as important. The bald statement, "I don't care
about the consequences," without more, will lead most audiences to
puzzlement and questions about capacity. Society accepts the deci-
sion not to care, but typically only when the person has implicitly
weighed consequences before making the decision. In these situa-
tions, such as a Christian Scientist refusing medical treatment, some-
one saying, "I don't care" does not mean indifference. Instead, the
Christian Scientist is saying something like, "My faith and my identity
as a Christian Scientist are more important to me than the health con-
sequences my doctors describe-I don't dispute that my gangrene win
kill me if it is left unattended; it is just that the doctors attend to the
gangrene with medicine, while I attend to it with faith."
Yet, dealing with consequences in decisions made by children is es-
pecially difficult precisely because children may lack the experience to
form an appreciation for different consequences. Experience is a criti-
cal element of knowledge.5 This is not to say that children do not
possess experience on which to draw as a basis for knowledge and
judgment-clearly they do, and they add to this store of knowledge
constantly. Democratic theories of education would argue that soci-
ety needs to do more to take advantage of children's knowledge and
54. See William James, Pragmatism, in Pragmatism And Four Essays From The
Meaning of Truth 43 (Ralph B. Perry ed. 1955) ("To attain perfect clearness in our
thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a prac-
tical kind the object may involve... ").
55. Many schools of thought consider experience an essential component of
knowledge. For example, this concept is fundamental to pragmatism and feminism.
See, e.g., Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is "Strong Ob-
jectivity"?, in Feminist Epistemologies 49, 55 (Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds.,
1993) ("[Wlomen's experience is the 'grounds' of feminist knowledge ....").
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experience, and involve them to a greater extent in decisions.56 Yet
certain kinds of experience are difficult for children to attain.
For example, the experience of regret 57 for life chances foregone is
a difficult experience for children to attain in a society that typically
gives children only short term projects, such as playing baseball, or
extraordinarily long ones, like completing elementary and secondary
education. Of course, children have opinions, including very strong
opinions, on whether a given activity is the best use of their time.
However, I mean something different by use of the tertm regret. Re-
gret in this context goes not to short-term issues, such as how one
spends an afternoon, but to long-term issues of identity and values.
Should someone cultivate talent for swimming or tennis, pursue excel-
lence in scholarship, spend time with friends, or engage in politics as a
vocation? While these choices are not necessarily as stark as I have
made out, trade-offs are necessary. An opportunity embraced is an-
other opportunity neglected. Unfortunately, someone may not know
whether she has made the right choice until she has already made a
substantial commitment of time and effort.
Children may have well-considered views on these issues, and par-
ents may be obtuse. Some children are quite capable of taking a long-
term perspective and deferring gratification, factors central to person-
ality development. For example, a child may feel that her parents are
pushing her into cultivating her talent for tennis, while she would
rather be spending time with friends. Considerations of voice suggest
that a lawyer must listen carefully to a child's concerns. At the same
time, however, a lawyer must be attentive to the possibility that chil-
dren will not be in a position to look back and reflect on their commit-
ments until relatively late into their minority.
Consider the consequences of neglecting an education. People can
appreciate these consequences fully only when they are no longer chil-
dren. The narrowing of options and life chances resulting from ne-
glect of an education is not a phenomenon which children experience;
they only experience the liberty of time away from books as time for
sports and play.58 The disapproving looks of adults may be a kind of
perverse positive reinforcement for children, confirming that they are
doing what will produce the most fun. So when a twelve-year-old
child says, "Getting an education is not important to me, so I prefer to
live with Dad, because he won't press me to do my homework," a
lawyer would be foolish to presume, without more, that this is a com-
petent decision.
Indeed, even a child who tells her lawyer, "I know that neglecting
my education will make it difficult for me to find a job, and-guess
56. See John Dewey, Experience and Education 35 (1938).
57. For an incisive analysis of regret, see Kronman, supra note 11, at 74-87 (1993).
58. See David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood 55 (1993).
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what-I don't care about that, either," should engender doubts about
capacity. In this sense, consequences entail both a procedural and a
substantive component. Even if the procedural element is present-if
a child acknowledges consequences, like the difficulty in finding a job
that results from neglecting one's education-substantive concerns
still counsel against deference to the child's decision. Does the child
really know what it is like not to have a job as an adult? No; she has
not had the benefit of experiencing that choice, and therefore cannot
fully appreciate its consequences. 9
D. Irreversibility of Decision
A lawyer for children should consider the danger of long-term ad-
verse effects of a decision in evaluating the competency of a child cli-
ent. Conceptions of the autonomy of children often rely on what
David Luban calls the "own mistakes" principle: the notion that peo-
ple are entitled to make their own mistakes, and to learn from them.6"
For children, whose experience is inherently more limited than adults,
learning is even more crucial. The thin autonomy argument, however,
fails in cases where a child's decision may make it less, rather than
more, likely that she will have the opportunity of learning in the fu-
59. of course it is correct that the lawyer affects the adult's life chances no matter
what the lawyer does. Nevertheless, this truism should not obscure the fact that some
chances will prejudice those life chances more than others. Making such judgments
about prejudice to life chances is something lawyers for children are not only permit-
ted, but required, to do. Any other view is either disingenuous, or else intolerably
thin in its assessment of the lawyer's role.
Some might assert that the dilemmas confronting lawyers representing children oc-
cur primarily in the custody and child welfare context, not in delinquency proceed-
ings. In delinquency proceedings, they argue, a lawyer is basically doing what any
criminal defense lawyer does, except with younger clients. The lawyer is not called
upon or expected to be an officer of the court, as is often formally or informally the
case in custody or child welfare matters. Yet this argument for the difference in delin-
quency is not entirely convincing.
It is not convincing because children, particularly if this is their first proceeding,
lack the experience to decide whether or not they want to take a plea, and to evaluate
the consequences of doing so. Going to a juvenile detention facility or a court-or-
dered placement can have a lasting effect on the child which the child cannot predict,
but which the lawyer can because of her experience. The result of such a sentence
may be an education in the wrong direction-an education in alienation and distrust.
A lawyer should be allowed to persist in negotiations and motion practice to seek a
dismissal of delinquency proceedings, even if the child wishes to plead. In particular,
if the child's rationale for wishing to plead is that he wants to "get it over with," the
lawyer should consider whether the child, some years in the future, would be happy or
sad that the lawyer took some more time to negotiate, and ultimately procured a
dismissal. A child's tolerance for boredom and ambiguity may be much less than an
adult's, but the child's preference, if acted upon mechanically by the lawyer, will
nonetheless affect the adult. In this context, as in the custody or child welfare context,
the lawyer for a child really has at least two clients: the child today, and the future
adult whose life will be irrevocably changed by the decision in which the lawyer is
involved. The lawyer must consider the interests of "both" clients.
60. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice 344-47 (1988).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ture.61 Where, for example, the child's decision can result in death,
concerns about conserving the opportunity for education become
paramount.
Consider the case of a fifteen-year-old girl with cancer whose doc-
tors are recommending a leg amputation.62 The girl has a very good
chance of survival with the amputation but virtually no chance with-
out it. The girl's refusal of the amputation63 will be irreversible, be-
cause without the amputation the cancer will spread. In this context, a
lawyer for the girl should demand some particularly compelling justifi-
cation, such as one rooted in the family's religious beliefs, before the
lawyer will regard a refusal as a competent decision.
E. Combatting Exploitation
Exploitation can also limit opportunities. Typically, the law concep-
tualizes exploitation as analogous to duress, a doctrine which it sepa-
rates from competence per se.64 Yet duress and competence both
have an impact on the issue of how much deference a lawyer should
accord to the preferences that an individual has asserted. The law
does not honor contracts made under duress, even though the individ-
ual so coerced at the time of formation of the contract stated that she
wished to enter into the agreement. A decision made under duress is
not knowing and voluntary-and therefore does not manifest in-
formed consent.
The law must recognize some conception of duress in the context of
representing children so that it can cope with overreaching, as it does
in contracts and other areas. 65 Duress need not be direct to affect
decision making. Indeed, some of the most insidious effects on deci-
sion making stem from indirect duress. Suppose a child wants to live
with her father, but the father has abused his wife, the child's mother.
The child is ten-years-old, and evidence indicates that she has inter-
nalized the scenes of domestic violence she has witnessed and drawn
the lesson that violence is an appropriate approach to domestic dis-
agreements. 66 While the mother gives every indication of being a fit
parent and her custody may wean the child from this perception that
violence pays, the father seems to be seeking custody mainly as a way
61. See Buchanan & Brock, Deciding For Others, supra note 42, at 238-39.
62. See Scott, supra note 7, at 234 n.7.
63. Let us assume that the girl's parents agree with her, that the hospital com-
mences a child welfare proceeding, and that the court appoints a lawyer to represent
the girl.
64. See Stefan, supra note 39, at 792-96.
65. See id.
66. See generally Mary P. Koss et al., The Prevalence of Intimate Violence, in No
Safe Haven: Male Violence Against Women At Home, At Work, and In the Commu-
nity 41 (1994) (discussing pervasiveness of domestic violence).
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of punishing his wife.6 7 Because the child's sentiment that she wishes
to live with her father stems, to a large degree, from her father's abuse
of her mother,68 a lawyer should discount heavily the child's view to
avoid ratifying the father's abusive conduct.
F. Presumption in Favor of the Primary Caregiver
While the preceding subsection suggests that the law may discount a
child's expressed wishes when they are the product of exploitation,
some basis exists for doing what a substituted judgment standard
seeks to do: make decisions based on the commitments and values
expressed through a person's life. Even very young children express
preferences and develop commitments, whether tacitly or actively.
The value of connection suggests that the law honor those commit-
ments whenever possible. The value of connection also implies that
continuity is important, so that connections are not needlessly sev-
ered. These concerns indicate that lawyers representing children of
questionable competence should presume that a child should remain
with her primary caregiver.69
The law should place a heavier burden of explanation on a child
who wants to leave her long-time primary caregiver than on a child
who wishes to stay with the primary caregiver. Children wishing to
turn their back on their established connections should have to ex-
plain why. Otherwise, the lawyer should consider whether resentment
over the caregiver's performing her role too well, insisting that the
child do her homework, for example, is behind the child's preferences.
Similarly, this interest in continuity dictates that a lawyer should
defer to a child who wishes to stay with both parents. The lawyer
should yield to the child's preference even when the parents are re-
spondents in an abuse or neglect proceeding, the exception being
cases where the child's injuries are so severe that the lawyer reason-
ably believes that extreme and imminent bodily harm will follow if the
natural parents retain custody.70 The attorney must realize that foster
care is not a mecca. For example, often foster care separates siblings,
even though sibling relationships may embody a child's most meaning-
ful commitments. Wishing to remain united with one's siblings is an
eminently rational goal that reflects the child's need for connection.
Considerations of voice cut the same way. In a situation where a
lawyer has been appointed to advocate for a child, the judge will al-
ways look to that attorney for the most disinterested expression of the
67. Cf. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1041, 1074-77 (1991) (discuss-
ing case law involving domestic violence and custody decisions).
68. Id. at 1055-57.
69. See Wizner & Berkman, supra note 1, at 345.
70. The exception in cases of extreme harm derives support from two factors: ir-
reversibility of decision making and combatting exploitation.
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child's wishes. All other things being equal, the lawyer should respect
her client's fear of foster care. The education value also points in this
direction: except in cases where serious bodily harm is imminent,
where the attorney may have separate authorization under the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules") to disclose otherwise privileged confidences,71 the child who
wishes her family to remain intact still knows more about her family
than the lawyer does. Thus, the lawyer should advocate for the child's
stated preference. Given the contextual view of competence ad-
vanced in this Article, such a preference for family unity manifests as
much competence as a lawyer has a right to expect from any client,
adult or child.
IV. ENHANCING COMPETENCE
This Article's argument that competence is made, not found, assigns
to lawyers the important task of enhancing the competence of their
child clients. The goal of enhancing competence partakes of the three
values, connection, education, and voice, described earlier-particu-
larly the goal of education.
A. Consulting with a Diagnostician
Consider how these values-connection, education, and voice-il-
lustrate the benefits and risks for the lawyer of consulting with treat-
ment or social service professionals who have treated or examined a
child. Such consultation clearly offers benefits to the diligent attor-
ney. Having access to the experience and insight of diagnosticians
who have treated the child over time can help a lawyer understand
and enhance her client's competence. The Model Rules recognize this
benefit and allow the lawyer who has doubts about her client's compe-
tence to consult a diagnostician.72
While diagnostic professionals play an important role in determin-
ing competency, the lawyer should consult the child before seeking
the help of a diagnostician. Despite the Model Rule's authorization, if
a child does not wish the lawyer to make such overtures, the lawyer
ordinarily should not do so. A child may feel some territorial interest
in the information that the personal diagnostician possesses. Indeed,
this quasi-property interest is the same interest that adults have in
communications with physicians, social workers, and lawyers. When a
child can express her wishes, even if the lawyer has reasonable doubts
about the child's competence, the lawyer should respect them. To vio-
late those wishes sends the message that the child is in fact helpless
and promotes the passive-aggressive behavior that is the principal
71. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules].
72. See id. Rule 1.14.
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means of resistance for those who have no direct voice.73 The loss of
trust embodied in such behavior, which may take the form of refusing
to communicate with the lawyer on other issues, is the central evil that
privileges seek to prevent.
Passive-aggressive behavior, and the loss of trust which it manifests,
is the antithesis of competence. Violation of the child's wishes makes
it more difficult for the child to act in the world and to find her voice
because it tells the child that adults do not listen. Building compe-
tence and responsibility-goals that are at the heart of the education
value-require, that at least on some personal decisions, children
have the opportunity to decide for themselves what they wish to do.74
A lawyer obligated to have a serious conversation with a child about
these issues will learn more about the child and the child's values than
a lawyer who can do an end-run around the child and use social ser-
vice and medical professionals as convenient surrogates for the child's
voice.
B. Empowerment Through Peers
Another strategy for enhancing child competence is consultation
with the child's peers. Peer groups are a useful way for people to
work through difficult situations. Various groups such as senior citi-
zens, substance abusers and their families, and survivors of domestic
violence, employ this strategy.75 Similar to adults, children can work
through issues in groups. Indeed, in custody and child welfare cases,
siblings acting as a group can be a vital source of empowerment, as
well as a resource for attorneys.76
Children working together may find, as adults do, that addressing
issues in concert with others is more productive than facing them
alone. Developing vehicles for such group learning in the custody and
child welfare settings will clarify children's sentiments, and enhance
73. See Winter, The Power Thing, supra note 36.
74. There may be times when dealing with children of doubtful competence that
consultation with a diagnostician (in the face of the client's refusal) is necessary to
deal with an emergency.
75. See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, Sharing The Journey 1-31 (1994) (analyzing sup-
port groups); Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation-
the Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 Am. UJ. Gender & L. 39, 43-44 (1993) (discussing
mutual aid among Latina survivors of domestic violence in Washington, D.C.); Betty
H. Morrow, A Grass-Roots Feminist Response to Intimate Violence in the Caribbean,
17 Women's Stud. Int'l Forum 579 (1994) (analyzing role of Women's Coalition of St.
Croix in fighting domestic violence). Mutual aid groups differ widely in the mix of
therapeutic and political discourses which they practice. Arguably, a therapeutic dis-
course of mutual aid risks turning public problems into private ones, while a political
discourse risks insensitivity to the affective needs of victims. For critical analysis of
support groups, see Wendy Kaminer, I'm Dysfunctional, You're Dysfunctional (1992)
and Linda Alcoff & Laura Gray, Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?,
18 Signs 260 (1993).
76. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1183.
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their competence to deal with life's challenges, as well as offering
more guidance to attorneys. Education theorists recognize increas-
ingly that children learn in school from interaction with their peers, as
well as from interaction with adults.77 Barring information gained in
such group sessions from direct use in custody or child welfare pro-
ceedings and instead using it mainly for ascertaining the views of chil-
dren and refining those views will cure any confidentiality concerns.
In addition, it will produce valuable insight for children and for their
lawyers. 78
C. Attorney Training
While using diagnostic professionals and peer groups can help en-
hance competency, training is essential for attorneys to appreciate the
insight which their child clients can provide. The curriculum for train-
ing should include study of child development theory, interviewing
and counseling, and the risk of bias in custody and child welfare deci-
sions. Helping professionals, clinical legal educators focusing on fam-
ily law issues, and children themselves, should be resources in this
training task.79 For example, foster children should be part of the
"faculty" dealing with child welfare proceedings, discussing both the
benefits and the drawbacks of their experiences in foster care.
A central focus of training should be on reducing the risk of bias.
For example, while attorneys frequently invoke the parents' relative
financial status as one element in deciding on custody,80 stressing fi-
nancial status -can unduly discount children's affective and cultural
ties.8' Issues of relative financial status are more properly the realm
of child support, not custody. Similarly, focusing on whether a parent
has remarried,82 and can provide a two-parent household for the child,
penalizes women, who tend to remarry less frequently than men. Fi-
nally, there is no evidence that a parent's sexual orientation correlates
with the self-esteem, gender identity, or sexual orientation of the
77. See generally Dewey, supra note 56.
78. The lawyer must also be willing to try alternative methods for communicating
with the child which depart from the traditional lawyer's office interview approach.
Interviews at the child's home, or at McDonald's, are useful strategies. See Lawyering
for the Child, supra note 1, at 1160-62 & n.163.
79. For a discussion of a simulation which explores dilemmas encountered by pro-
fessionals in child welfare proceedings, see Jean Koh Peters, Jose and Sarah's Story:
The Usefulness of Roleplay in an Ethically-Based Evaluation of the Present and Future
Family Court, 21 Pac. L.J. 897 (1990).
80. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1169 n.205 (discussing different
criteria attorneys might consider when assessing a child's preference for placement).
81. In some settings, such as child placement cases within the purview of the In-
dian Child Welfare Act, courts must weigh supplying material abundance less heavily
than conserving cultural heritage.
82. Evidence suggests that some attorneys consider the issue of remarriage when
making decisions for a child they deem to be incompetent. See Lawyering for the
Child, supra note 1, at 1169 n.205.
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child.83 Affective concerns, such as the emotional ties between a par-
ent and child, and concerns such as parental commitment of time to
education, continuity of caregiving, and freedom from exploitation,
should be more important when lawyers consider how to counsel a
child client about custody. Careful training is the best way to avoid
the mix of arrogance and ignorance which unfortunately characterizes
much representation of children today.
V. REPRESENTING AN INCOMPETENT CHILD: ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES
The potential for arrogance and ignorance is greatest when a lawyer
appointed to represent a child decides that the child is not competent.
Some commentators have proposed curbing the risk of abuse in this
situation by limiting the lawyer to fact-finding. 84 Unfortunately, this
restrictive approach does not effectively address concerns about law-
yers overreaching their roles. In addition, the restrictive approach ig-
nores the important function of substantive values in lawyering. A
contextual approach, which provides lawyers with substantive gui-
dance and training, limits the effects of bias and arrogance without
stifling the child's voice.
A. The Fact-Finder-Only View
Standards enacted by the American Academy of Matrimonial Law-
yers embrace the restrictive view, recommending that lawyers for con-
cededly incompetent children be barred from taking substantive
positions in custody cases.85 The Commentary to the Academy Stan-
dards asserts that an attorney who makes decisions for an incapaci-
tated client is compromising "the rule of law" by interposing her own
values in the place of the client's.8 6 Those values will vary from attor-
ney to attorney, the Commentary declares. When lawyers interpose
their own values, decisions will vary, and courts will be inconsistent in
their decisions involving similarly situated children, thus violating the
rule of law.87
83. See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to
Social Science Research, 1 Law & Sexuality 133, 157-61 (1991). For a discussion of
sexual orientation and custody, see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 Geo. LJ. 459 (1990). Cf. Marc A. Fajer, Can
Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal
Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511 (1992) (using narra-
tive to explore the interaction of gender, sexual orientation, and the law).
84. See Academy Standards, supra note 15, § 2.7 (prohibiting a lawyer from even
advocating a position).
85. See id § 2.7 cmt.
86. IL
87. Id.
1996] 1497
While the restrictive view stems hom valid concerns, its premises
are unpersuasive. The view offers an unduly narrow account of the
role of values in the attorney-client relationship. In addition, it cre-
ates a false dichotomy between two activities which are fundamentally
intertwined-finding facts and articulating substantive positions. In
light of these concerns, limiting lawyers for incompetent children to
factfinding will only exacerbate, not resolve, the abuses the restrictive
view's proponents identify.
The first problem with the restrictive view is its narrow view of the
role of values in attorney-client counseling. Proponents of the restric-
tive view are troubled by the influence of lawyer values on positions
taken for incompetent child clients. This concern discounts the fact
that the attorney-client relationship frequently involves lawyer values.
Most directly, substantive values inform a lawyer's assessment of a
client's competence.8 8 Even with unimpaired clients, attorney values
may fundamentally reshape client decisions.8 9
A lawyer's values often will influence the position she advocates for
a client because clients do not necessarily come to attorneys with pref-
erences fully formed. Often a client's decision about what legal posi-
tion to take is a product of deliberation between lawyer and client.
The Academy Commentary recognizes this when it notes that the re-
sponsibilities of a lawyer's role may sometimes require her to "con-
front" clients whose initial preferences are imprudent or self-
destructive.9° In some cases, a lawyer should "persuade" the client to
relinquish her position. 91 Of course, lawyers may disagree about ex-
actly which positions they consider to be self-destructive or impru-
dent, depending on the individual lawyer's values. The only difference
between these situations and those in which lawyers for impaired cli-
ents make decisions is that in the latter case the law deems the clients
to lack capacity. The problem in this latter scenario, however, is that
someone other than the client is making the decision, not that the de-
cisions will vary with the attorney's values.9 2
88. See supra notes 39-71 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the contex-
tual approach uses substantive values to assess a child's competency).
89. See Kronman, supra note 11, 128-34; Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to
Lawyers?, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1759, 1769-70 (1993).
90. See Academy Standards, supra note 15, § 2.4 cmt.
91. See id. (indicating that if counsel is ineffective in persuading client, then coun-
sel must zealously advocate client's wishes).
92. That this delegation to another decision maker is central to the Academy's
concerns is plain from the Commentary's refusal to permit even guardians ad litem,
typically appointed expressly to safeguard the child's best interests, to express an
opinion in custody proceedings. Academy Standards, supra note 15, § 3.2 & cmt.
Guardians ad litem do not have role problems, as attorneys with impaired clients do,
with staking out their own positions; guardians ad litem are appointed expressly to
stake out such positions. Indeed, the Academy Commentary also urges that guardi-
ans ad litem not only be attorneys, but also be selected from the ranks of social work-
ers and psychologists. To the extent that the objection with attorneys speaking out is
that they lack the expertise to determine what is best for the child, the objection
[Vol. 641498 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
LAWYER AS CAREGIVER
This concern about the identity of the decision maker does not con-
sider that, in practice, someone other than the client may make the
decision even in cases where a client is deemed to be competent.
When an attorney is sufficiently persuasive, and a client sufficiently
weak-willed, as will be the case with some of the vulnerable clients
represented in custody disputes, even an unimpaired client may effec-
tually cede decision-making authority to her attorney. Indeed, studies
suggest that matrimonial lawyers routinely seek this abnegation by cli-
ents in divorce proceedings. 3
The only way to stop this phenomenon of disparate attorney values
driving litigation decisions is to bar all clients, including spouses seek-
ing divorces, from retaining counsel. The Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers, however, stops short of recommending this step. The Acad-
emy, therefore, envisions custody proceedings in which divorcing
spouses have lawyers, but many children have only limited representa-
tion. The most concrete result of this regime would be an increase in
the power of matrimonial lawyers. Such increased power will not
make custody adjudication more responsive to children's needs.94
should not hold for social workers and psychologists, unless one believes that all ex-
pertise is overblown and tends to undermine parental authority. See Fineman, supra
note 12, at 735 (arguing that social service professionals systematically discount ma-
ternal interests in custody litigation).
93. See Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the
Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. Legal Educ. 43, 52-53 (1991); Austin Sarat & Wil-
1am L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client
Interaction, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 737, 741-43 (1988).
94. Professor Guggenheim, the Reporter for the Academy Standards, has previ-
ously suggested, for legitimate reasons, that the entire notion of court-appointed ad-
vocates for children in custody disputes is counter-productive. There are good
reasons for this position: court-appointed advocates for children can disregard chil-
dren's connections with parents; apply invidious biases; and allow judges to escape
responsibility for decisions. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 135-43; see also
Mlyniec, supra note 1, at 9-10 (stating that "[t]he advocate seemingly makes the ulti-
mate decisions regarding what is the child's best interest").
Curbing or eliminating lawyers for children, however, significantly increases the
power of matrimonial lawyers. Life for matrimonial lawyers would be much easier if
they did not have to worry about the "wild card" of an advocate for children who may
disagree with them about the outcome of the case. A little inconvenience may be just
what matrimonial lawyers need, however, in light of their tendency, amply docu-
mented in a well-known empirical study, see Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 93, at 741-
43, for putting their own convenience ahead, not only of the welfare of the children
involved in custody disputes, but also of the wishes, needs, and emotions of their own
clients.
While one does not want to unduly generalize about matrimonial lawyers, some of
whom in my experience are exceptionally thoughtful about gender issues and other
matters important to custody disputes, the Sarat and Felstiner study is a sobering look
at a cross-section of behavior within the matrimonial bar. Other lawyers, including
poverty lawyers, have been criticized for similar behavior which places professional
power over client welfare. See Alfieri, Reconstrutive Poverty Law, supra note 8, at
2146-47. One does not need to single out matrimonial lawyers to appreciate that
reducing the power of an advocate for children just gives the other advocates more
authority, and that sound policy must take this factor into account.
14991996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The restrictive view is also problematic because it creates an artifi-
cial dichotomy between values and substantive positions on the one
hand, and factfinding on the other. Narrative theory teaches that any
account of facts either states or implies a particular substantive posi-
tion.95 A lawyer cannot organize facts in a coherent manner unless
she first takes a position which informs how she should organize the
facts. 96 Indeed, the Academy's Reporter, Professor Guggenheim, rec-
ognizes as much in his path-breaking article, The Right to be Repre-
sented But Not Heard,' which notes that the information yielded by
the attorney as fact-finder "will have been colored by the Investiga-
tor's values, by his sense of what is relevant and what is not."98
B'ecause of the link between values and fact-finding, allowing the
lawyer for a child to expressly advance a substantive position will as-
sist the court in assessing the accuracy of the related facts. A judge
can better evaluate accuracy of facts if she knows the position which
the relator takes, and can discount that perspective accordingly. If the
judge does not know the relator's bias, she cannot appropriately
weigh the accuracy of the recounted facts. That is why asking about
the bias of witnesses is always a fair ground for cross-examination.
In addition, the need to take a position enhances the. advocate's
sense of responsibility. The advocate has to work harder in order to
find evidence to support her position. An advocate who does not take
a position may settle for routine fact-finding which does not help the
court or the client. An advocate's knowledge that she cannot directly
influence the outcome of a case may make her lazy, a phenomenon
which is already a concern in representation of children.99 The excep-
tion to that tendency will be in .cases where an attorney can convey
her position merely through an ostensibly "neutral" presentation of
facts. In such cases, of course, the distinction the Academy Standards
draws between taking a position and finding facts disappears. 10
95. See Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in
On Narrative 1, 3 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1981).
96. Judges are the best example of the corollary of this statement, namely, that the
substantive position one takes necessarily influences how one recounts facts. The
statement of facts in any judge's opinion will differ, depending on the result which the
judge reaches. The judge will include some facts, and omit others, depending on how
she decides the case. For instance, Justice Cardozo found it unnecessary to include
the name of Mrs. Palsgraf in the body of his opinion in that notable case. See John T.
Noonan, Persons and Masks of The Law 111 (1976).
97. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 108-09.
98. Id. at 108.
99. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799,
877 n.338 (1992) (citing commentaries on this issue).
100. Prohibiting a lawyer for an incompetent child from stating a position will also
frustrate another goal set out in the Academy Standards: the promotion of settle-
ment. Negotiating with an advocate who refuses to take a position does not foster
settlement, but instead magnifies uncertainty. At some point in settlement, parties
need to have the opportunity to ask each other, "What are your goals and interests?"
Negotiating with someone who lacks the authority to answer that question is difficult,
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B. Lawyering for Incompetent Child Clients: A Contextual View
The better, more contextual approach to dealing with the problems
of attorney arrogance identified by the restrictive view is to allow the
lawyer to play a range of roles, including fact finder, mediator, and
advocate, while offering both training and some substantive guidance
to reduce the effect of invidious biases on the advocate. A cardinal
virtue of this approach is that it perceives the ambiguities of repre-
senting children as posing challenges, whereas the restrictive view sees
only perils.
This openness to ambiguity more effectively captures the realities of
representing children. The contextual view acknowledges that fact-
finding, advocacy, and mediation are intertwined, instead of seeking
to separate them into neat compartments, as the restrictive view at-
tempts to do. In addition, the contextual approach reflects the inter-"
action of connection, education, and voice in the representation of
children. It realizes that a child's connection to her family and the
ongoing education process that shapes her development necessarily
affect the child's voice. 10 1 Such interaction makes the lawyer for a
child more like Brandeis's "lawyer for the situation,"1°2 like a special
master appointed in complex, "polycentric" cases,'0 3 and like the "de
facto guardian" mentioned in the Commentary to the Model Rules.1
0 4
In its openness to ambiguity, the contextual approach reflects the
experience of lawyers representing children. Most lawyers for chil-
dren move from one role to another, as the needs of their client re-
quire, regardless of the terms they use to describe their role. 0 5
Practice in this area is too fluid for the kind of cabining contemplated
by the restrictive view.
if not impossible. Cf. Jonathan M. Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotia-
tion: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 863 (1987)
(discussing theories of negotiation).
101. While voice is always a plural concept-with many voices contributing, even
within a single person, see Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, supra note 8, at 2485; Margulies,
The Mother With Poor Judgment, supra note 8, at 709-16-the values of connection
and education are especially salient with children.
102. See generally Lawyering for the Child, supra note I (advocating a generalized
or "lawyer for the situation" role for attorneys representing a child clients).
103. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 1281 (1976). Because of the importance of connection, a lawyer for a child
must take into account the interests of the child's family. For analysis of the lawyer's
responsibility in representing groups, see generally Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centered-
ness Multiplied- Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest
Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1103 (1992); John Leubsdorf, Plu-
ralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (1992); William H.
Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
104. See Model Rules, supra note 71, Rule 1.14 cmt.; cf. Margulies, Acess, Connec-
tion, and Voice, supra note 4, at 1093-98 (discussing de facto guardian concept in
context of elder law). But see Tremblay, supra note 8, at 1435-45 (taking a critical view
of the de facto guardian approach).
105. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1146-50.
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Proponents of the restrictive view are correct in warning that this
very fluidity offers opportunities for the introduction of invidious bi-
ases into advocacy for children. The contextual approach deals with
this problem not through cabining the role of the lawyer for the child,
which merely allows more room for the prejudices of the other law-
yers, but instead through training and substantive guidance. Training
should emphasize the unreliability of factors such as parent's financial
or martial status, or sexual orientation.0 6 In addition, three substan-
tive factors should inform lawyering for incompetent children: (1)
conserving continuity of caregiving, assessed with reference to the sta-
tus quo before the commencement of legal proceedings; (2) promot-
ing parents' commitment of time to their child's education; and (3)
preventing violence against the child or other family members.
Lawyer reliance on substantive factors in the representation of in-
competent children is not a new concept. Indeed, Professor Guggen-
heim, the most eloquent proponent of the restrictive view, suggests
continuity of caregiving as a default position for lawyers representing
very young children. He recommends that lawyers for young children
in child welfare cases argue for preservation of parental rights. °7
Avoiding exploitation is another well-established goal reflected in
statutes, case law, and commentary. 08 Similarly, commitment of time
to education' 0 9 is a goal which embodies society's concern for chil-
dren's development.
Consider how the contextual approach might work in the arena of
visitation, one of the crucial issues in a custody proceeding. The law-
yer for a three-year-old girl might encourage the parties to the pro-
ceeding to agree that the noncustodial parent, the father, would enjoy
liberal visitation. 10 The lawyer would base her efforts on perceptions
gleaned from the girl's eleven-year-old half-sister, who lives with the
girls' mother, social service professionals, and from meeting with the
three year old at her home, where the child spoke about missing her
father. Change the facts somewhat, however, and the role of the law-
yer under a contextual approach also changes. Suppose that the
mother informs the lawyer that the father battered her while they
lived together, sometimes in front of the three-year-old. In this situa-
tion, the lawyer might shift from a mediator's role, seeking consensus
on the issue of visitation, to a fact-finder's role, informing the court
106. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
107. See Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 138-43.
108. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Function in the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1975, at 226, 282-83.
109. This factor is phrased in terms of commitment of time so that a lawyer cannot
view a parent's mere financial commitment as dispositive. Stressing a time commit-
ment allows the lawyer to avoid the issues of class bias raised earlier. See supra notes
80-83 and accompanying text.
110. For examples of this kind of negotiation with parents in a custody proceeding,
see Wizner & Berkman, supra note 1, at 334-43.
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both of the three-year-old's sentiments and about the spousal abuse
that occurred in front of the child. If the father happened to be seek-
ing custody in this case, the lawyer for the three-year-old could shift
roles again, acting as an advocate in opposing the father's bid, despite
the three-year-old's sentiments. Protecting the child from exploita-
tion, so that her voice is not stunted, would govern the lawyer's role.
In another situation, involving a child who wishes to live with her
father because he will not make her do her homework, issues of a
parent's commitment of time to education will shape the role of the
lawyer. The child's preference clearly does violence to the value of
education, which is premised on the cultivation of long-term perspec-
tives over short-term views. Mechanically following the child's prefer-
ence, regardless of the child's age, is an abdication of the lawyer's
obligation to counsel her clients."' The lawyer has a responsibility to
stress to the client the importance of education.
If the child persists in her preference, the lawyer would have two
options under the contextual model. First, particularly with younger
children, the lawyer can advocate against the child's preference, on
the ground that the child's short-term perspective demonstrates a lack
of capacity." 2 Second, with older children, the lawyer could act as a
fact finder, bringing to the attention of the court both the child's pref-
erence and the reason behind it. The one thing that the lawyer should
not do in the "I like Dad because he won't make me do my home-
work" scenario, 1 3 absent some other reason which the child articu-
lates for her preference, is seek to do what a lawyer would do for
other clients: strategize on how to vindicate the client's goal, if neces-
sary by browbeating the mother into relinquishing custody. Vindicat-
111. Proponents of the restrictive view would agree that counseling is called for in
this situation. See Academy Standards, supra note 15, § 2.4 cmt.
112. When a lawyer determines that a child lacks capacity, she should proceed as
the Model Rules permit, as a de facto guardian. She may seek appointment as a
guardian ad litem, although we should view this as a formal conferral of legitimacy,
not as any guarantee that the child's interests will be more effectively or authentically
represented. Although a lawyer who is also a guardian ad litem experiences a conflict
of interest, this conflict is no greater than other possible solutions to decision-making
issues, such as naming another person as the guardian ad litem. A lawyer who is also
the guardian ad litem will be more likely to spend time speaking with the client and
obtain guidance when necessary. When another person is appointed as the guardian
ad litem, the lawyer is likely to spend more time speaking with the guardian ad litem,
and less time with the client. In addition, the lawyer's need to maintain credibility
with the court is a more effective check on abuse than any of the largely nominal
checks on the guardian ad litem's authority. But see Tremblay, supra note 8, at 1435-
45 (asserting value of legal checks on guardian's authority). This arrangement also
means the child has one person, not two, to communicate with, which gives the child
more opportunity to influence decisions. As a legal services lawyer who has done
much work in this area says, the lawyer should strive, in terms of legal formalities, to
be "as close as possible to the child."
113. This Article's use of this hypothetical should not obscure the fact that many
children will desire the involvement and discipline provided by the mother in the
scenario. See Lawyering for the Child, supra note 1, at 1169 n.207.
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ing the values of education and connection that underlie the court's
appointment of counsel for children require a less partisan approach.
CONCLUSION
The contextual approach will not banish the conscientious lawyer's
dilemmas. It does, however, offer a framework for making lawyers
more sensitive to the context of competency decisions. The approach
embraces three values-education, connection, and voice-and re-
jects the false dichotomies between autonomy and welfare, substance
and process, and fact and value. It offers a flexible approach to deter-
mining competency, in which substance and process in decision mak-
ing are both legitimate concerns.
In addition, the contextual approach, rather than forcing a lawyer
for very young children into a narrow role as the restrictive approach
does, allows the lawyer to choose the most appropriate strategy, in-
cluding advocacy, fact-finding, and mediation. The contextual ap-
proach holds that cutting off access to any of these roles frustrates
effectiveness in the other two. Indeed, the most concrete result of
limiting the role of the child's lawyer is augmentation of the power of
the other lawyers in the proceeding.
To guard against the possibility of the child's lawyer taking over
proceedings and acting as a kind of judge on the cheap, the contextual
approach uses three factors as guidelines: (1) continuity of caregiving,
assessed with reference to the status quo before the commencement
of legal proceedings; (2) parents' commitment of time to their child's
education; and (3) the presence of exploitation or violence against the
child or other family members. The approach also advocates training
in listening skills and avoidance of invidious bias, such as bias based
on a parent's social class, sexual orientation, or marital status.
The contextual approach does not make a lawyer a surrogate parent
for the child she represents. A lawyer assuming the surrogate parent
role can only stifle the client's voice and prompt the kind of over-
reaching which commentators who favor limitations on the lawyer's
role criticize. At the same time, the lawyer for the child must ac-
knowledge the connection which shapes the child's values and the
need for education which will define the child's voice. This creates a
paradox. A lawyer who purports to be a surrogate parent for a child
will not perform her role adequately. However, a lawyer who never
feels the urge to act as a surrogate parent and then to channel this
urge into connecting with her client, will also not be a good lawyer for
children. The virtue of the contextual approach is that it allows law-
yers to find their way between these extremes.
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